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Race
Abstract:  David Mamet's  Race  is overdetermined by the paratexts hovering around it,
most  notably  the  essays  in  which  he  publicizes  his  conservative  turn.  This  textual
environment accentuates the text's participation in a contemporary political discourse that
social scientists have theorized as post-racialism. But Race accommodates more complex
and conflicted meanings: I read the play not so much as an advertisement of post-race
ideology but as a text that exposes and deconstructs this ideology. I argue that this layer
of meaning is primarily an effect of the legal drama genre on which the text draws. The
conventions of the legal drama that Race invokes activate meanings in the text that cannot
be fully controlled by the backlash-agenda articulated in the author's essays.
Introduction
It is not unusual that David Mamet's writing provokes intense responses. Typically designed
to be provocative, in terms of their subject matter as well as their language, his plays and
movie  scripts  have  often  sparked  contentious  viewing  experiences.1 His  drama  Race,
however,  which  premiered  on  Broadway  in  2009  with  a  production  directed  by  Mamet
himself, seems to have been even more controversially received than usual for the author.
Written  in  the  wake  of  Mamet's  much-discussed  conservative  turn,  the  play  –  revolving
around a black woman's alleged rape by a white man and the efforts of his lawyers to defend
him – was frequently reviewed as exhausting itself in provocative language while advertising
the author's recently proclaimed political perspectives. John Lahr, writing for the New Yorker,
calls the play an "exercise in contrarian provocation" (n.pg.) and notes that "Mamet seems to
insist on an unbridgeable divide between black and white America. His play acknowledges
the hatred but not the source of the division." Another reviewer observes that "Race doesn't so
much court controversy as proclaim its contentiousness all the way back to the cheap seats: its
four characters [...] spend the better part of 90 minutes shouting at one another in bountifully
expletive-strewn Mamet-speak on the subject of race in America" (Doherty n.pg.).
I suggest that David Mamet's Race is overdetermined by the paratexts hovering around
it,  most  notably  the  essays  in  which  he  publicizes  his  conservative  turn.  This  textual
environment reinforces and accentuates one dimension of the play’s political semantics: It
encourages a reading of  Race  as a backlash-project, as lashing out against the remedies to
1 Ira Nadel’s summary assessment of Mamet’s oeuvre as “[c]hallenging, controversial, abrasive” (266) finds
itself amply reflected in the reviews and criticism surveyed by Sauer and Sauer.
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racial injustice that evolved in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement,2 an approach outlined
in the only academic treatment of the material  to date,  Cynthia  Young's  discussion of its
Broadway  production  in  American  Quarterly.  But  the  text’s  political  semantics  are  less
unified than such readings suggest; the play accommodates more – and more conflicted –
layers of  meaning  than  an  exclusive  orientation  toward  the  author's  professed  intentions
render invisible. My reading aims to shed light on a dimension of Race where the text exposes
and  deconstructs,  rather  than  advertises,  post-race  ideology.  Consciously  bypassing  any
speculation  about  intentionality,  my  discussion  will  treat  this  destabilization  of  post-race
ideology as a textual effect and trace it primarily to the legal drama genre on which the play
draws.3 The conventions of the legal drama that  Race invokes activate meanings in the text
that work against the backlash-agenda that presumably informs the text. My discussion of
Race thus aspires to be a case study that, both, probes into a political discourse that distinctly
marks the contemporary moment, and a case study that possibly explores another dimension
of the new relevance of (popular)  genre that  Andrew Hoberek has diagnosed in  different
contexts of 21st-century fiction (237-41). 
In the following, I will begin by succinctly discussing the political discourse of post-
racialism as theorized in social science scholarship, and outline how this discourse manifests
itself in Mamet's essays and his drama Race. I will subsequently turn to the genre of the legal
drama and examine its conventions, with a particular focus on those conventions that have
been established as instrumental for the genre's political work. My reading of Race will then
proceed  in  two  steps.  I  will  first  explore  how  the  genre-specific  tropes  of  social
constructivism and legal theatricality activate meanings in Mamet's text that exceed, if not
undermine, the post-race project articulated in the paratexts. Finally, I will discuss how this
ambiguation of political meaning is further aided by the ways in which the play inscribes its
characters into post-racialism's structures of interests. 
2 In addition, the text also deeply resonates with an anti-feminist backlash. For reasons of space, I am unable to
discuss in greater detail the interactions between discourses of ‘race,’ gender, and class in Race.
3 It is, of course, tempting to ask whether Mamet here wants to demystify post-racialism or whether he does so
unwittingly. If the demystification is understood as an unintended effect, it is similarly tempting to ask what
causes the discrepancy between authorial intention and its textual implementation. These are discussions my
article does not open up (while I would greatly look forward to them). Proceeding from the assumption that
any text is polysemic, my article rather aims to tease out a dimension of Race where its text works against the
political project it allegedly pursues.
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Post-Race Ideology and the Politics of Mamet's Race
Mamet's  play  as  well  as  the  essays  that  hover  around  it  distinctly  resonate  with  a  new
discourse on 'race,' a social discourse revolving around the alleged end of racism in the US
that social scientists have described as "color-blind racism" or "post-racialism." The former is
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's term, who develops it in a sociological study based on a large set of
interview data collected in the late 1990s. Bonilla-Silva applies the term to a discourse that
"acquired  cohesiveness  and  dominance  in  the  late  1960s"  (2)  and  has  received  new
momentum with Barack Obama's election to the Presidency. At its core, Bonilla-Silva argues,
the discourse consists of "explanations – which have ultimately become justifications – for
contemporary racial inequality that exculpate [whites] from any responsibility for the status of
people of color" (2). He highlights that color-blind racism works as an ideology, a "political
tool for the maintenance of the racial order" (3) that has succeeded the racism of the Jim-
Crow era. Sumi Cho conceives of post-racialism – the term I will use in the following – along
very similar  lines.  A legal  scholar  who situates  herself  within Critical  Race  Theory,  Cho
analyzes more formal pieces of discourse than Bonilla-Silva,  contemporary texts from the
fields of politics, law, cultural journalism and scholarship. There, too, she finds a powerful
new discourse about 'race' that "reflects a belief that due to the significant racial progress that
has been made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based
remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of social
action" (1594). Cho also insists that post-racialism works as an ideology in contemporary US
society, "provid[ing] a common-sense rhetoric and reasoning to fuel the state's retreat from
racial remedies" (1594), most notably, from Affirmative Action. Ultimately, she notes, post-
racialism works  toward  the  "redemption  of  whiteness:  a  socio-cultural  process  by which
whiteness is restored to its full pre-civil-rights value" (1596).
Cho identifies four discursive properties or strategies that characterize post-racialism,
three of which are of particular relevance for a discussion of Mamet's Race:4 first, a narrative
of "racial progress" which is used to argue that 'race' no longer matters in US society (1601);
second, invocations of "race-neutral universalism" as an ideal to which politics should aspire;
in this context, "[r]acial remedies [...] are cast as partial and divisive, and benefiting primarily
those with 'special interests' versus all Americans" (1602); and, third, the discourse treats Jim-
Crow racism and post-Civil-Rights racial remedies as essentially the same, drawing a "moral
4 The  fourth  property  Cho  lists  more  exclusively  concerns  the  fields  of  legal  and  political  discourse:  a
"distancing move its practitioners frequently undertake to distinguish themselves from civil-rights advocates
and critical-race theorists" (1603).
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equivalence" between the two as forms of "racialism" (1603). Cho's findings significantly
overlap with Bonilla-Silva's, who points to a set of story-lines as constitutive of color-blind
racism. Central among these is "The past is the past" (77), a story-line that works to suggest
that "discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting minorities' life chances" (29). In its
various  incarnations,  then,  the turn-of-the-millennium discourse of post-racialism suggests
that the US has overcome racism, that the nation's racist history is thus of no relevance for its
present, that racial inequality either does not exist anymore or is the result of individual /
cultural life-choices, and that policies like Affirmative Action discriminate in ways that are
just as unfair as Jim Crow legislation.
Bonilla-Silva's and Cho's conceptions of this new brand of racism provide a compelling
framework for efforts to understand David Mamet's essay "We Can't Stop Talking about Race
in America" (2009) and his drama Race that he announces there. The essay was preceded –
and often read in conjunction with – another essay he had published in The Village Voice just
a year earlier: "Why I Am No Longer a 'Brain-Dead Liberal'" (2008). In this much discussed
article,  Mamet  testifies  to  his  conversion  from liberalism to  neo-conservatism.5 Defining
liberalism as the worldview "that everything is always wrong" (n.pg.), he relates his epiphany
that  "everything  was  not  always  wrong,  and  neither  was  nor  is  always  wrong  in  the
community in which I live, or in my country." The essay goes through and dismisses a whole
catalog  of  liberal  topoi,  affording the  writer  a  foil  for  a  comprehensive  neo-conservative
credo:  President  Bush  and  his  policies  are  not  so  bad  –  the  problem  rather  rests  with
government per se, which is inherently inefficient and potentially corrupt ("I am hard-pressed
to see an instance where the intervention of the government led to much beyond sorrow.");
corporate capitalism is a force of good because it facilitates social mobility (he only talks
about the upward kind, of course); and the American military is good because it is "made up
of those mean and women who actually risk their lives to protect the rest of us from a very
hostile  world."  The  essay  is  a  neo-conservative  confession  par  excellence:  It  dismisses
governmental policy-making in favor of private, marked-based solutions to social problems.
In addition, it flatly denies the existence of structural inequalities in US society, ignoring how
these inequalities inform the very position of privilege from which Mamet writes.6 
5 See Vorlicky for a discussion of the essay's reception. Most recently, the essay has received renewed attention
in the wake of the publication of The Secret Knowledge, a non-fiction book in which Mamet expands upon
the  ideas  articulated  in  "Why  I'm  No  Longer  a  'Brain-Dead  Liberal.'"  Vorlicky's  article  half-seriously
ventilates the idea that Mamet's essay, like his writing in other genres, might be designed to provoke: "I
wondered if Mamet's  pseudo-polemics,  his 'eye-opening'  confession were a bit  of a 'con' – a beautifully
crafted piece that challenged the reader to think for herself or himself" (209).
6 Interestingly,  Mamet comes very close to reflecting on his own position of privilege – in term of class,
gender, and race – but then turns away from it, deflecting from the question with an invocation of America's
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When Mamet tackled the topic of 'race' in his  New York Times article  "We Can't Stop
Talking about  Race in  America,"  the text  immediately evoked this  recent  self-positioning
within neo-conservative thought. Announcing to work on a play that would become Race, he
challenges 'liberal' discourses and policies concerning 'race' in ways that deeply resonate with
the dynamics of post-race ideology. His argumentation adopts many of the discursive frames
and strategies that Cho and Bonilla-Silva identified. In a key passage, he insists:
[J]ust as personal advantage was derived by whites from the defense of slavery
and its  continuation  as  Jim Crow and segregation,  so too personal  advantage,
political  advantage  and  indeed  expression  of  deeply  held  belief  may  lead
nonwhites  to  defense  of  positions  that,  though  they  may  be  momentarily
acceptable, will eventually be revealed as untenable. (n.pg.)
Concluding that "[m]ost contemporary debate on race is nothing but sanctimony – efforts at 
exploitation and efforts at restitution seeking, equally, to enlarge and prolong dissent and 
rancor," the essay ends by insisting "[w]e are bound to each other, as are all Americans. [...] 
And we not only seem to be but are working it out."
This essay, together with Mamet's confessional Village Voice article, inevitably informs
readings of  Race, the play that he announces in "We Can't Stop Talking about Race" as the
artistic project in which he wants to develop these post-race ideas. Cynthia Young's discussion
of the play's Broadway production reflects such a reading. She argues that "[r]ather than a
complex interrogation of black and white racial dynamics, the play is an expression of white,
male disaffection in the Age of Obama" (1014). She arrives at this reading by assuming, on
the one hand, that the drama's main characters express the author's perspective – not only the
real author's perspective, belabored in the above mentioned essays which she also discusses,
but also the implied author's, to use Wayne Boothe's term, the "semantic intention" (Schmid
n.pg.)  inscribed  in  the  text.  On  the  other  hand,  her  interpretation  is  predicated  on  the
assumption that the text unambiguously establishes the facts of the case around which its plot
revolves. This plot concerns charges of rape brought against wealthy white Charles Strickland
by a nameless black woman, and the efforts of lawyers Jack Lawson and Henry Brown – the
former white and the latter black, as the text insistently emphasizes – to defend him. Young
suggests that  Race establishes these rape-charges against Charles as false, depicting him as
the victim of a post-Civil-Rights consensus on racial politics. The agent of his victimization
is, in Young’s reading, the nameless woman, who turns out to be a prostitute with whom
Charles had had a long-term relationship that he casts as one of love. In this understanding of
alleged 'classlessness': "Do I speak as a member of the 'privileged class'? If you will – but classes in the
United States are mobile, not static [...]."
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the plot, Charles' betrayal by his black lover is mirrored by the betrayal of the white lawyer-
character  Jack  by  his  young  black  colleague-mentee  Susan  who,  like  the  rape-victim-
impostor, exploits to her personal advantage the power that contemporary racial discourse and
policies give her and sabotages her bosses’ defense strategy. In the end, Charles confesses to
the  rape,  which  Young  reads  as  a  marker  of  his  final  breakdown  in  the  face  of  an
overpowering consensus on his guilt. She concludes that, in Race, "white and black people are
revealed to be locked in bitter antagonism with white men who are ultimately the casualties of
their sneakier black opponents" (1020).
Genre: The Legal Drama
If Young's reading indeed taps into the semantic intention behind Mamet's Race – and there is
much evidence  to  suggest  that  she  does  –  I  find  the  actual  text  of  the  drama to  deliver
something much more complex. This complexity significantly owes to the work of genre in
the text. As most genres that reach into popular culture, the legal drama is both emphatically
present  as  a  genre-concept  that  informs  much  writing  and  reading  across  the  media  –
including that of Mamet's  Race – and it is notoriously hard to define. The sheer amount of
scholarship  on  the  text-type  variously  called  "courtroom  drama,"  "trial  film,"  or  "legal
thriller," to name just a few of the terms in use,7 testifies to the genre's prominent cultural
presence. Difficulties in delineating its contours chiefly result from its inherent dynamism and
flexibility – it may be feasible to positively define more narrow sub-genres of the legal drama,
yet the overarching genre resists fixation. Accordingly, its most compelling conceptualizations
are the ones that are programmatically loose and open. Film scholar Ross Levi is a case in
point: Surveying a series of potential 'fixed' definitions and dismissing each as too narrow, he
eventually arrives at a conception of the legal drama as narratives that "[have] something to
say about the way Americans view their legal system and the players within it " (xiv). It is
Levi's  thematic,  rather  than  formal,  approach  that  makes  his  definition  so  productive,
accommodating the range of protagonists, settings, and plots that characterize the genre. Its
protagonists,  he  suggests,  are  best  conceived  of  as  "players"  in  the  legal  system –  most
frequently  lawyers,  but  at  times  also  judges  or  jurors.  And  its  plots  revolve  around  the
operations of the legal system, often but not exclusively around trials. The openness of Levi's
definition, as those of many other scholars, does not imply that the legal drama is a 'weak'
7 See, e.g., Clover ("trial film"), Machura and Ulbrich ("courtroom drama"), Levi ("legal cinema"), or Rapping
("law series"). In this essay, I use the term "legal drama" to emphasize the genre's transmedia quality, and to
avoid the suggestion that use of a courtroom-setting is constitutive of the genre.
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genre; to the contrary, it emphasizes the flexibility that greatly enables the genre's continuing
circulation  in  American  (popular)  culture,  while  highlighting  that  this  openness  is  still
anchored in a genre-'core' that allows cultural participants to recognize a legal drama when
they see one.
This recognizability is, of course, key to the dynamics of genre, allowing individual
texts to invoke the conventions established by a particular corpus of cultural artifacts. The
transmedia corpus of the American legal drama has built a number of conventions, of which I
want to highlight the ones that seem to be central to the kind of political cultural work that the
genre has shown itself able to do. A significant aspect in this context is the depiction and
framing of the legal system that the tradition of the legal drama has established, a tradition
that endows the genre with a distinctly ethical and political potential. Several scholars have
commented on the ways in which the legal drama explores the law as a paradigmatic space for
the definition and enforcement of social order, a social microcosm that metonymically reflects
on the institutional structures, power relations, and discourses on a larger social scale.8 Gregg
Crane9 suggests that the legal system offers a particularly rich foil for the interrogation of
social structures and dynamics because it combines an ethical dimension with one of historio-
political specificity: "The law offers [writers] a particularly attractive and iconic complex of
meaning which is  simultaneously historically particular and ethically universal" (768). He
argues that legal dramas do this work of social critique by juxtaposing legal codes and process
– typically marked as historically specific – with ethical conceptions of justice: Texts of the
genre, he suggests, tend to revolve around one central question – whether the law "serve[es]
the interests of justice" (769). Crane's survey of American law narratives outlines that the
genre's critical potential has often been used to explore social identity categories – especially
'race' but also gender – as constructions that violate the demands of justice; constructions in
whose manufacturing and enforcement the law plays a central role. His discussion of texts
ranging from Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird to Tom Wolfe's The Bonfire of the Vanities
highlight how the law has been conventionalized as a site that hosts interrogations of the ways
in which social structures, power relations, and discursive formations are interrelated. 
Several other scholars have asked for the strategies by which the genre thus examines
the dynamics of social construction, pointing to the narrative and theatrical qualities of the
legal  process,  and  of  trials  in  particular,  as  parameters  of  the  law  that  legal  dramas  –
8 See, e.g., Kuzina or Haralovich.
9 Crane’s essay does not work on conceptualizing law-related fiction as a genre. In what could be seen as an
even more radically thematic approach, he rather employs a very broad notion of “law narratives.”
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themselves  narrative  regimes  (cf.  Black  34)  –  explore,  not  only  in  their  diegetic
representations of the law but also in their own narrative forms. Film scholars David Black
and  Carol  Clover  are  among  those  who  have  highlighted  how  legal  dramas  "enact  the
structure  and  narrative  procedures  of  real  trials"  (Clover  270),  arguing  that  the  genre
structurally maps itself on the narrative and theatrical dynamics of the law.10 This mapping
lends  the  genre  a  distinctly  self-conscious  quality.  As  Black  observes,  because  "[l]egal
processes,  to  a  large  degree,  involve  and  revolve  around  processes  of  narration  and
storytelling," and because "[f]ilms about the law are [...] narratives or instances of storytelling
[,  ...]  films  about  law  are  stories  about  the  process  of  storytelling,  or  narratives  about
narrative" (55). This self-consciousness often surfaces in what Julie Peters has identified as
the  law-as-theater-trope,  invocations  of  the  analogy  between  law  and  theater,  trials  and
theatrical performances (cf. 180) that punctuate much discourse on the law, including legal
drama. Self-conscious moments like the law-as-theater-trope play a significant role for the
genre's political work. On the one hand, they gesture toward the metonymic quality of the law
as paradigmatically related to other socio-cultural practices that are narrative and performative
in nature. On the other hand, they distinctly activate the audience by aligning them with the
adjudicating instance depicted in their storyworlds of law, catalyzing their recipients' work of
interpretation by suggesting parallels to the deliberations and judgments judges and jurors are
called upon to make.11
The  legal  drama,  then,  has  been conceived as  a  flexible  yet  distinct  and culturally
powerful genre. The conventions with which the robust tradition of American legal dramas
has associated the genre especially concern its imaging of the legal system as a microcosm
that signifies on society at large and that invites both ethical and political reflection. They
further entail explorations of the law as a narrative and performative regime, explorations that
enable  reflections  on  the  construction  and  constructedness  of  social  categories  in  the
metonymic microcosm of law,  and that  point to the legal  drama text's  own narrativity or
theatricality in ways that can mobilize critical engagement.
10 Legal scholar Julie Peters thus defines the theatricality inherent in the law: "the central events of law – trials
– [...] are normally performed before live audiences by those specially trained to shed their own identities and
'represent' others. Trials are the re-enactment of a conflict [...] whose essential narrative form is dialogue.
They exploit iconic props as crucial clues to the unfolding of the narrative, and often rely on space, staging,
costume, and spectacle in an attempt to bring back to life the dramatic event they are attempting to recount"
(180-81).
11 For a more extensive development of this argument, see my "'To Sue and Make Noise.'"
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Social Constructivism and Theatricality in Race
Mamet's Race not just notably partakes of these genre conventions, it also actualizes them in
ways that put a particular emphasis on exploring the constructedness of social categories –
most prominently, of the category of 'race,' in its intersections with gender and class, and of its
ongoing work as a discursive creator of social inequalities. The text's most poignant move in
this context is its choice of setting: Fully avoiding the courtroom that figures as the most
typical setting for legal dramas, Race is exclusively set at a law office. Its plot, accordingly,
does not revolve around a trial but around the strategizing that attends an impending trial,
from the lawyers' deliberations whether to take the case to the ways in which they develop
and  adapt  their  defense  strategy as  new pieces  of  evidence  continue  to  surface.  Already
through this formal choice,  the text accentuates the engineering that underwrites the legal
process, the extent to which the facts of a case as well as the identities of its litigants are not
just there but manufactured, and strategically so.
This  emphatic  constructivism,  and  the  ambiguity  that  results  from  it,  are  further
developed by the text's depiction of the legal system, an aspect of its storyworld that genre
conventions, as noted above, frame as metonymic of social institutions and systems of social
ordering.  The text  advances  an  image of  the  legal  process  as  defined  by uncertainties  –
concerning the precise events to be judged in court, their meaning, and, crucially, the guilt or
innocence of the litigants. The play begins with several dialogues that depict 'facts' and 'truth'
as highly malleable entities in law, framing them not as external referents for the legal process
but as its  rhetorical products.  When, in the text's opening scene,  the client Charles enters
Henry's  and  Jack's  office  in  search  for  legal  representation,  he  provides  Jack  with  an
opportunity to sermonize on the relevance of truth. Upon Charles's request that he wants his
lawyers to believe him, Jack responds:
"Belief,"  sir,  hamstrings the advocate.  Who is,  then,  "anchored to the facts." I
"believe" in the process. Whereby: each side is permitted. To engage an attorney.
Does this find the truth? Neither side wants the truth. Each wants to prevail. Does
society "deserve" the truth? Alright. Will they get it? Never. Why? As the truth is
in doubt even to the litigants. Each of whom will first lie to himself, then to his
attorney, and then to the court, to bring about an outcome which he deems just.
Which is to say, "victory." (9)
This passage polemically depicts the law as a system incapable of accessing the 'truth.'
This incapacity is cast as an inherent feature of the legal process because it is organized as a
competition – elsewhere in the play troped as an "alley fight" (8) and as a "war" (26) – whose
adversarial  momentum  overwrites  any  considerations  of  truthfulness,  to  the  extent  that
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litigants are prone to self-deception. The legal process, the passage suggests, is not designed
to  bring  out  truth  and  effect  justice;  rather,  it  is  designed  to  accommodate  battles  that
ultimately revolve around social privilege: Depending on the version of the events in the case
at  hand,  the  privileges  pursued  here  either  concern  ownership  of  money  (if  we  follow
Charles's narrative of his wrongful accusation) or ownership of a black woman's body. It is
not the desire for truth and justice that motivates the agents in the legal process, but their
desire to win, to accumulate more privileges than their opponents. And the lawyers, as the text
highlights in a dialogue in close proximity to Jack's lecture, engage in the legal process with a
similar desire for accumulation: Upon Charles's question why Jack assumes that the rape-
accusation against him is false, Jack responds "Because you will be paying us to support that
assumption" (8).
These passages, prominently located on the drama's opening pages, provide a powerful
framework for the ensuing text. On the level of plot, they emphatically ambiguate Charles's
statements about the events in question and about himself. His own repeated insistence on his
innocence  as  well  as  his  lawyers'  assumption  that  their  client  is  innocent  are  framed  as
rhetorical moves rather than positive facts in the storyworld. By the same token, Charles's
self-representation as a liberal, non-racist person appears as a – possibly strategic, possibly
self-deceptive – fiction that the character seeks to advance. Both narratives – of the falsity of
the accusations brought against him and of his non-racist identity – are conspicuously marked
as  discursive  practices  rather  than  representations  of  diegetic  truth.  Thus  framed,  the
character’s  statements  reflect  the  key  mechanism  of  post-racialism,  its  operation  as  a
discursive regime.
On a more abstract level, these passages develop an image of the legal system that, by
metonymic implication, signifies on the broader socio-cultural dynamics that underwrite post-
race ideology. They cast the law as a social microcosm that focalizes the manufacturing of
identity categories, and that highlights the extent to which the production and circulation of
'race' and gender are governed by and serve the maintenance of existing power structures. The
functional relationship between the legal system and social power relations is already figured
in  the  metaphor  of  the  battle  in  which  litigants  compete  for  "victory"  (9),  a  trope  that
characterizes the law as a system driven by the competition for social privilege. Individuals
enter this competition on widely unequal terms, as the text emphasizes in its close attention to
the characters'  respective positions  in  social  power structures and to  their  anxieties about
downward mobility. This applies to the lawyers, who coyly advertise their "desire for Fortune
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and Fame" (11), but even more so to their client. Charles's wealth and fame play a central role
in his characterization, and while they may complicate the case, they also clearly facilitate the
kind of sophisticated defense that the text has the two lawyers develop. This character 'owns'
the legal system not only because he is rich enough to hire any lawyer he wants and to offer
his  accuser  money  to  drop  her  charges;  the  text  also  highlights  how  the  whiteness  and
masculinity that Charles can claim have a history of mattering in the law. As Henry,  the
African-American  of  the  black-and-white  lawyer-team,  observes:  "Fifty  years ago.  You're
white? Same case. Same facts. You're innocent" (10). Finally, the text does not merely depict
in its storyworld how the legal system more willingly yields to the privileged than to the
socially marginalized, it also performs this unequal access in its own form by giving only
Charles  a  voice  and  a  forum for  his  version  of  the  events,  while  the  woman  whom he
allegedly raped remains both unheard and nameless. In its diegetic content as well as its form,
the text thus constructs the law as a system shaped by and serving existing power relations.
And in the drama's storyworld, power is clearly still concentrated in the hands of rich white
men.12
Next  to  the  social  power  structures  and  dynamics  that  the  text  –  invoking  well-
established genre-conventions – refracts  in  the legal  system, the law in  Race serves as  a
microcosm  in  which  the  mode  by  which  social  categories  are  manufactured  becomes
particularly visible.  The drama stages  the  law,  in  polemical  intensification  of  the  genre's
familiar tropes, as a system that fabricates truths, facts, and identities by way of narrative and
spectacle. It points to these particular discursive practices, suggesting that the law does not
command them to 'represent' a fixed extra-systemic reality, but that it rather 'makes' reality
through these discursive practices. If this image of the law already offers a telling metonymic
reflection on the genesis and work of identity categories in a broader social context, the text's
commentary  on  the  different  efficacies  of  narrative  and  spectacle  in  contemporary
negotiations of 'race' is a particularly acute diagnostic moment.
It is primarily the character of Jack who gets to advance this image of the law: "There
are no 'facts of the case.'  There are two fictions.  Which the opposing teams each seek to
impress  upon  the  jury"  (14).  By Jack's  analysis,  the  success  of  such  competing  fictions
12 The presence of a black partner in the play’s diegetic law-firm reinforces rather than challenges its projection
of a world in which power is tied to whiteness. For one, Henry’s character is clearly secondary to Jack’s, who
stands at the center both of the text and of the law-firm it depicts. In addition, Henry gets to perform a
conspicuous type of mimicry: His function in the drama seems to consist of voicing the most racist positions,
from stout opposition to Affirmative Action (cf. 70) to the ostentatious use of racist invective.
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depends on their narrative quality and on the quality of their performative rendition in front of
the jury. This analysis is reflected in the defense strategy that the lawyers develop:
Jack: The jury has a story. In their head. About what happened in that room. We
have to drive that story out of their heads.
Susan: How?
Jack: Tell them a better story. (26)
In the case at hand, it proves difficult to find "a better story" because the prosecution's
story is so plausible: a white man rapes a black woman; a powerful and rich man rapes a
woman who needs to sell her body for a living.13 The plausibility of the prosecution's story
owes to the work of feminist and African-American historiography that have made public the
historical role of rape in American race and gender relations: It is plausible because power
relations that reach from American history into the present evoked by the drama are known to
entail rape as a tool of dominance and subordination. Tellingly, the lawyers seem to find that it
is impossible to compete with this  story on purely narrative grounds, and they resolve to
attack by way of spectacle, to "put on a better show" (26). The "show" by which they want to
win the jury is a re-staging of the alleged rape: "Same dress. [...] Woman of a similar size puts
on the dress. Somebody. Throws you down. [...] Upon a mattress ... put a bed in the court [...]"
(39). The semantic, narrative function of this "demonstration" (39) is to prove that the sexual
encounter between Charles and the nameless woman was consensual – that if Charles had
forcefully ripped off the woman's sequin dress, there would be sequins all over the place,
which police reports of the alleged crime scene, at this point in the plot, do not mention. But
the performance entails a surplus on which the lawyers clearly count: the spectacle of a black
woman's  sexualized  body and  its  sanctioned  commodification  by  a  white  man  –  a
commodification encoded on multiple levels (on the level of the performed plot, depicting a
black woman's rape;  and on the level  of the performance itself,  in  which a black female
"[m]odel"  [40]  enacts  a  sexual  scene  under  the  auspices  of  the  white  lead-lawyer  Jack
Lawson). 
13 The revelation that Charles's alleged victim is a prostitute is a contentious moment in the text. I read it as a
signifier  of  the  character's  class  identity,  adding  another  dimension  to  the  inequality  that  marks  her
relationship to Charles. The way in which all the male characters respond to this revelation – tacitly treating
it as proof that the event was no rape – adds to the text's depiction of rape myths as interlocking not only with
racism but also with classism. I discuss the concept of 'rape myths' in greater detail below. Where I see the
text expose this mythology, Cynthia Young reads the play as endorsing it: "In Mametworld, [the revelation
that the woman is a prostitute] renders her unrapeable, literally beyond the category of rape victim" (1016).
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The shift in focus that the text depicts, from just "tell[ing] a better story" to "put[ting] on
a better show"14, offers a very instructive reflection on the dynamics of contemporary post-
racialism.  For  the  lawyers'  project  of  challenging  the  historical  narratives  unearthed  by
minority scholarship and activism – a project in the storyworld that deeply resonates with the
agenda of post-race ideology – spectacle seems more efficient than narrative. Narrative is a
discursive mode that relies on the representation of a sequence of events, a sequence that is
governed by some sort of causality. Its chief appeal to its recipients is an invitation to decipher
the  meaning  of  this  causality.  It  is  narrative's  capacity  to  represent  meanings  with  great
rhetorical force that has made it a central discursive mode in various fields, including history,
politics, or law.15 Spectacle, by contrast, works through visual stimulation; its chief appeal is
affective  –  spectacle  offers  "sense-based  aesthetic  experiences"  rather  than  invitations  to
"meaning-making,  'reading'  or  interpretation"  (Darley  4).  Whereas  narrative's  primary
operation is representational, that of spectacle is presentational (cf. Bukatman 78) – spectacle
shows where narrative tells, and, in doing so, spectacle ultimately refers to itself as an event,
an experience. Several scholars conceive of spectacle as anti-narrative in its work, tracing its
potential  to  disrupt  narrative  to  the  intensity  of  affect  it  can  unleash  and  to  its  self-
referentiality.16 Mamet's text depicts spectacle as the preferred mode of 21st-century post-race
(and post-feminist) backlash, a mode that seeks to mobilize opposition against the narratives
of  the  Civil  Rights  and  other  emancipation  movements  by  exploiting  the  anti-narrative
potential of spectacle, building on the direct stimulation of affect. The particular stimulus on
which the characters in the text plan to rely invokes one of the most canonical spectacles in
Western culture – "[w]oman displayed as sexual object" (Mulvey 19) – a spectacle that, as
Laura Mulvey outlines, has more than proven its audience appeal.17
However, the embedded spectacle in Race never takes place. What stops it short, what
prevents it from manufacturing a 'truth' favorable to Charles's position in the trial, are 'hard'
14 The shift I see there is less than readily apparent in the text, because the characters seem to use the terms
"story" and "show" somewhat interchangeably. The shift does manifest itself, however, in the various ideas
for defense strategies that the lawyers ventilate, ideas that initially involve story-lines meant to challenge the
prosecution on narrative grounds ("it's a war-story" [26]) but that eventually focus entirely on the spectacle of
the "demonstration."
15 For an impression of how narrative has become a significant category of analysis for various institutional and
discursive contents, see, e.g., Andrews et al. or Heinen and Sommer.
16 Scott  Bukatman traces  this  theorization of  spectacle as  anti-narrative to Laura Mulvey's  landmark essay
"Visual  Pleasure  and  Narrative  Cinema":  Mulvey,  he  notes,  conceives  of  spectacle  as  "more  than  an
unnecessary supplement to narrative [... .] Because it is precisely not narrative, it lies beyond a narratively-
grounded conceptual schema, and that 'beyond' threatens the totalizing coherence of the narrative system.
Spectacle, by actively disrupting narrative coherence, threatens the stability of the narrative system" (75).
17 Here, too, the text reinforces its diegetic content through its form: Its genre – drama in general, and legal
drama in particular – distinctly resonates with the spectacular. 
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facts: a revision of the police report and a witness testifying to the presence of sequins at the
alleged crime scene. By a similar dynamic, the drama's ending brings the lawyers' efforts to
fabricate 'facts' to an abrupt halt when Charles confesses to the rape.18 I read the confession as
well as the surfacing of new evidence as moments in which the text has referentiality 'strike
back,'  undermining the post-structuralist sensibilities appropriated by the lawyer-characters
for their post-race project. The text here vents an anti-post-structuralist skepticism that, as
McLaughlin  observes,  circulates  widely  in  post-postmodern  culture  (50).  In  Race, this
sentiment works to mobilize critical reflection on the ethics of the social practices that the text
stages in the microcosm of law, practices that figure the ideology of post-racialism.
Agents of Post-Race Ideology
These social practices staged by the text are, of course, connected with agents – the play’s
characters  –  whose  implication in  the structures  of  post-racialism affords  another  context
where the text exposes the ideology’s operations. Significantly,  it  is not only Charles,  the
client, whom the text constructs as an agent of post-racialism; it also gradually reveals the
ways  in  which  Jack  is  implicated  in  the  discourse  and how –  in  and through these  two
characters  –  post-racialism  operates  as  an  ideology.  The  drama  does  so  primarily  by
juxtaposing the trial that awaits Charles and the inner-office conflict that erupts as this trial is
being prepared, evoking parallels between Charles and Jack, the nameless victim of Charles's
alleged rape and Susan, the firm's black female junior associate. Jack's characterization as
complicit with post-race ideology particularly mobilizes critical reflection, on the one hand
because he is established as a character who – in contrast to Charles – is very aware of the
dynamics and history of 'race' in the United States, suggesting that discursive awareness does
not preclude racism. On the other hand, genre conventions frame Jack, the lead lawyer, as the
character with whom the audience is encouraged to identify. The eventual revelation of his
complicity thus also reaches out to the audience, provoking them to reflect on their own ideas
about 'race' – an appeal that the text reinforces through its use of the genre's law-as-theater-
trope.
18 Of course, this confession is as ambiguous as any statement by the character, and Young does read it as fake:
"Mamet has the billionaire martyr himself by confessing to a crime he did not commit. Eschewing the vast
cultural and financial resources he could use to win an inevitable acquittal, Charles's liberal guilt demands
that he pay for his real and imagined sins" (1020). However, this reading strikes me as much less compelling
than that of the confession as a truthful representation of the events in question, compelled by the appearance
of evidence (the sequins) that make an acquittal everything but inevitable.
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The character of Charles actualizes, in almost paradigmatic form, the social position and
sensibility that drives, and benefits from, post-race ideology. He represents  the position of
privilege  in  contemporary  US society,  inhabiting  a  point  in  the  social  matrix  where  the
privileges of whiteness, wealth, and masculinity overlap and reinforce each other. The plot
confronts him with equally paradigmatic  accusations,  charges that  emphatically evoke the
history of US race relations and that frame as a crime what used to be claimed as a 'natural'
entitlement by subjects privileged in terms of gender and 'race.' In his self-representation,
Charles appropriates the discourse of victimhood, fashioning himself as an "innocent" (15)
"victim" (13). The statement that Charles plans to make to the press halfway through the plot
is additionally telling: "I believe I was wrong ... I believe we are all brothers beneath the skin.
And though I did not legally assault her ... [...] I believe there has been a misunderstanding,
that  though  the  actual facts  of  the  case  are  not  as  the  young  woman stated  ...  perhaps,
perhaps, on some 'moral' level ..." (43). Anticipating his eventual confession, the statement
reflects the character's increasing difficulties in rationalizing his own actions. His invocation
of a "misunderstanding" as well as his attempts to draw a line between a 'legal' and a 'moral'
dimension of rape evoke what feminists scholars have called rape myths, "the mechanism that
people use to justify dismissing an incident of sexual assault from the category of 'real' rape"
(Burt 130). The dynamics of denial and justification entailed in rape myths distinctly resonate
with the operations of post-race discourse – a discourse that the passage summons by the
trope of  "brothers  beneath the skin" –,  in  its  work of denying the social  reality of  racial
inequality and of authorizing a white hegemony. Charles, then, emerges as a character that not
only  conspicuously  exhibits  the  social  positionality  of  post-race  discourse,  but  that  also
exposes one of its key discursive dynamics.
In contrast to Charles's, Jack's inscription in practices of post-racialism is less blatant,
primarily contoured through the text's paralleling of its two 'trial'-plots. Jack's interactions
with  Susan,  the  black  female  lawyer  he  hired  and  thinks  of  a  mentoring,  are  gradually
revealed to show parallels  to  Charles's  relationship to  the nameless woman.  And like his
client,  Jack faces  accusations  of  having violated  Susan's  privacy in  ways  enabled  by his
position of power and informed by the two characters' social subject positions. In terms of
power, the relationship between Jack and Susan is as asymmetrical as that between Charles
and the prostitute whom he at one point claims to have loved (10) – both asymmetries that
call to mind persisting structural inequalities on the job market. Jack relates to Susan chiefly
in terms of her gender and 'race,' amounting to a fixation that he rationalizes as professional –
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as owing to her  outstanding potential  as a  lawyer  (54),  or as resulting from his business
interest in seeking to safeguard his firm against a possible Affirmative Action suit (69) – but
that the text clearly casts as more visceral. Jack's pursuit of visceral gratification becomes
manifest in the violations he inflicts upon Susan, violations that simultaneously exploit and
signify his position of power toward her.  One violation is of a legal nature: his unlawful
investigation of Susan's private life when she applied at the firm. The piece of information he
retrieved there that betrays Jack by his careless mentioning of it – a private trip to Venice that
Susan  took  without  listing  it  on  her  employment  form –  suggests  by  virtue  of  its  utter
irrelevance and inconseqentiality that this investigation exceeded the 'rational'  demands of
Jack's business interests. 
The other violation is explicitly related to the rape-case and concerns Jack's request that
Susan impersonate the alleged rape-victim in the "demonstration" he plans to stage in court.
Let me (re-)quote this passage at some length:
Jack:  Same dress. Exact same dress. Woman of a similar size,  you could do it.
Woman of a similar size puts on the dress. Somebody. Throws you down.
Susan: Throws me down?
...
Jack: You could put on the dress. 
Susan: Why? Because I'm black.
(pause)
Jack: Well, it has to be a black girl. (39-40)
The passage as much correlates Susan and the rape-victim as it correlates the alleged
rapist Charles and the lawyer Jack who asks an associate to put on a sequin dress and have
that dress ripped off in a mock-rape staged in court. This request emphatically signifies on the
dynamics of sexual harassment at  the workplace: a professional woman is  reduced to her
(female black) body by her employer. Jack's use of language in this passage – the shortening
sentences, the repetitions – suggests his growing arousal, an arousal that may as much owe to
the  strategic  promise  of  the  projected  demonstration  as  to  its  erotic  promise.  The  scene
resonates  with  several  other  moments  in  the  plot  that  reveal  Jack's  routine  sexism in his
professional interaction with Susan, e.g. his recourse to a sexist trope when explaining his
ideas for the defense strategy ("OUR JOB is to create [a particular kind of experience for the
jury. ...] Do that in courting, the woman expresses her appreciation, lifting up her dress; in
law, they do so, by letting your client go free." [27]). Even more telling is his response to the
witness  statement  that  eventually  surfaces,  indicating  that  Charles  had  called  his  alleged
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victim "you nigger bitch" at the night in question. When the lawyers discuss this new piece of
evidence, Jack turns to Susan: "Anybody ever call you that, while he was fucking you? Crazy
with love?" (37). As his request that Susan play the rape-victim in court, Jack's vicarious use
of  an  appellation  toward  his  colleague  that  combines  racist  with  sexist  insult  and  that
immediately invokes the rape deeply inscribes him in the structures of post-racialism.
This characterization of Jack greatly affects reading or viewing experiences of the text.
For one, it encourages distance toward the character, his statements and actions, that are thus
not  straight-forwardly  claimed  by the  text's  implied  author  but  rather  put  up  for  critical
interrogation.  This  is  of  particular  relevance  in  moments  when  Jack  wields  post-race
discourse, moments that complement Charles's naïve articulations of the ideology through the
political  and  rhetorical  sophistication  that  the  lawyer  represents.  Jack  especially  gets  to
articulate the post-racial topoi that Sumi Cho has identified as "Race-Neutral Universalism"
and "Moral Equivalence" (1600): When confronted by Susan that his investigation of her is
illegal, he responds: "Okay, that's illegal. But on the other hand it's  wrong, you understand?
It's wrong" [sic.] that folks of different colors are treated differently under the law. It was
wrong then, and it's wrong now" (53); and he adds, a few moments later, "you tell me that
equally, you might not exploit being Black? Or that any human being whatever might not,
when pressed, exploit whatever momentary advantage he or she possesses?" (55). The scene
in which Jack makes these points notably evokes parallels to a trial – his dialogue with Susan
resembles a cross-examination in which she confronts him with his racist behavior and he
tries to justify his actions. His justifications take distinct recourse to the discourse of post-
racialism, arguing that "race-based policies or remedies" like the Affirmative Action program
that Jack targets, are "partial and divisive" (Cho 1602), and "draw[ing] a moral equivalence
between 'racialism' under Jim Crow which subordinated racial minorities, and the 'racialism'
of  the  civil-rights  era,  which  sought  to  remedy  minority  subordination"  (Cho  1603).  In
contrast to Charles's (truthful or strategic) invocation of ignorance and naiveté concerning the
history and politics of 'race,'  Jack presents himself as a character that actively manipulates
racial discourse to his personal advantage and, more abstractly, to normalize white hegemony.
In addition, Jack's inscription in post-racialism’s structures of interest unfolds particular
force  because  genre  conventions  frame  him as  the  character  with  whom the  audience  is
encouraged  to  identify.  The  tradition  of  American  legal  drama,  as  indicated  above,  has
preferred to make lawyers its main characters, and especially the popular legal drama of serial
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television  and  fiction  has  tended  to  imagine  its  lawyer-protagonists  as  heroic.19 Jack's
positioning as the drama's main character along with his characterization as a 'savvy' agent in
the world of law raise the expectation that he will play the heroic role in the text, inviting
readers and viewers to adopt his words and actions as their own. This identification becomes
increasingly difficult  to sustain as the plot reveals the racist  and sexist  dimensions of his
character.  The  gradual  quality  of  this  revelation  especially  works  toward  involving  the
audience,  progressively  provoking  them  to  interrogate  their  own  identification  with  the
character. The text reinforces this appeal to the audience through its use of the law-as-theater-
trope, a genre convention that, as noted above, builds on the similarities between legal trials
and theatrical performances to align the text's audience with the audience of its intradiegetic
courtroom  performances,  most  typically  the  jury.  Mamet's  Race explicitly  advances  this
allegorization  of  the  courtroom as  theater,  for  example  when  Jack  refers  to  his  defense
strategy as a "show" and to himself as an "entertainer" of the jury (26). Even more directly,
the character all but synonymizes jury and audience:
Our job. Is to get them on the jury to accept our new definition of the Group to
which they belong. Not 'the whites' or 'the blacks.' [...] But the new group – which
is called 'the jury." [sic.] Another name for which is, The Audience. We're going to
put  on  a  show.  And  we  "amuse"  them  –  they  may  forget,  their  individual
allegiances and, for a moment be conjoined. (41)
This correlation of courtroom and theater, jury and audience in a text that is a drama, meant
for  theatrical  performance  on  stage,  self-consciously  addresses  its audience  as  an
'adjudicating'  instance.  It  not  only  cautions  them to  be  weary  of  how  its  narratives  and
spectacles might manipulate them, it also asks them to interrogate their own prejudices and
biases in order to pass a 'verdict' that is just. 
Conclusion
David Mamet's Race provides an interesting case study of the poetics of politics in early 21st-
century  American  culture.  Situating  itself  in  the  neo-conservative  turn  that  marks  some
corners of contemporary intellectual culture, the play engages with the new ideology of post-
racialism and its  backlash politics.  It  does  so in  ways  that  are  markedly complex,  if  not
conflicted:  The  text  presents  itself  as  politically  more  ambiguous  than  the  paratextually
announced authorial intention, accommodating a layer of meaning that exposes rather than
advertises post-racialism. I specifically traced this layer of meaning to the conventions of the
legal drama on which Race draws – its framing of the legal system as a social microcosm, its
19 See, e.g., Geenfield on cinematic legal drama, or Rapping on tv legal drama.
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emphasis on the narrativity of the law to expose the construction of social categories, and its
self-conscious  use  of  the  law-as-theater-trope.  Reading  Race in  the  context  of  these
conventions, I argued, draws attention to the ways in the play opens up spaces for critical
reflection and mobilizes interrogation of racism’s contemporary inflections.
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